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Climate change is already having adverse effects on animal life, and those effects are 
likely to prove devastating in the future.  Nonetheless, the relevant harms to animals have 
yet to become a serious part of the analysis of climate change policy.  Even if animals and 
species are valued solely by reference to human preferences, consideration of animal welfare 
dramatically increases the argument for aggressive responses to climate change.  We esti-
mate that, even under conservative assumptions about valuation, losses to nonhuman life 
might run into the hundreds of billions of dollars annually.  Whatever the precise figure, 
the general conclusion is clear:  an appreciation of the likely loss of animal life leads to a 
massive increase in the assessment of the overall damage and cost of climate change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Polar bears depend heavily on Arctic sea ice for their survival.  
When sea ice breaks up and drifts as a result of polar warming, the 
bears must move northward to find stable platforms.  Hunting be-
comes more difficult, because the bears are rarely successful in finding 
food on open water.  Pregnant females, who must leave the ice to find 
their preferred terrestrial den areas, are forced to swim great distances 
and to fast for long periods, as the ice drifts farther from land.  Even if 
pregnancy is successful, the bear cubs—raised in suboptimal habitats 
with malnourished mothers—are most unlikely to flourish. 
Harlequin frogs are a vibrantly colorful and active genus of frog in 
Central and South America.  They suffered widespread extinction in 
the twentieth century—67% of 110 species—despite attempts at habi-
tat protection.  The culprit is apparently a pathogenic outbreak trig-
gered by climate change.  The chytrid fungus grows on the frogs’ 
moist skin and eats away at their epidermis and teeth, before ulti-
mately killing them.  Tellingly, approximately 80% of the lost harle-
quin species disappeared after an unusually warm preceding year.1
The British ring ouzel, a shy species of thrush with a high chirping 
call, has been in decline for most of the last hundred years.  Up to 
58% of the population disappeared from 1988 through 1999, and as 
few as 6000 mating pairs are left.  High temperatures and precipita-
tion in the preceding year have been linked to subsequent declines in 
the ring ouzel population.  Biologists speculate that temperature and 
rainfall extremes have led to a decrease in food availability.2
These are but three examples of the potential impact of anthro-
pogenic climate change on animal life and welfare.  While the current 
effects of climate change on human beings are disputed,3 there is little 
question that the impact on animal life is already substantial.4  Projec-
1 J. Alan Pounds et al., Widespread Amphibian Extinctions from Epidemic Disease Driven 
by Global Warming, 439 NATURE 161, 163 (2006). 
2 Colin M. Beale et al., Climate Change May Account for the Decline in British Ring 
Ouzels Turdus Torquatus, 75 J. ANIMAL ECOLOGY 826, 827-28 (2006). 
3 Some studies suggest that up to 150,000 human lives are already lost annually 
due to climate change.  See, e.g., Jonathan A. Patz et al., Impact of Regional Climate Change 
on Human Health, 438 NATURE 310, 313 (2005) (citing a World Health Organization 
study). 
4 See, e.g., Camille Parmesan & Gary Yohe, A Globally Coherent Fingerprint of Climate 
Change Impacts Across Natural Systems, 421 NATURE 37, 41 (2003) (discussing an analysis 
of over 300 species that shows significant changes caused by climate warming); Terry L. 
Root et al., Fingerprints of Global Warming on Wild Animals and Plants, 421 NATURE 57, 57 
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tions into the future are much bleaker.  One particularly dramatic 
study, published in Nature in 2004, suggests that 15% to 37% of all 
species—potentially millions—could be committed to extinction by 
2050 as a result of anthropogenic climate change.5
Yet conventional economic analysis of climate change has virtually 
ignored these effects on nonhuman life.6  A highly influential study by 
economists William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer treats the welfare cost 
of species loss as too small or uncertain to be accurately quantified.7  
Bjørn Lomborg’s well-known analysis of the problem simply fails to 
discuss animals at all.8  Nicholas Stern’s massive study makes little ef-
fort to come to terms with the effects of climate change on animals, 
notwithstanding its emphasis on the omissions in previous treat-
ments.9  Richard Tol recognizes the impact of climate change on 
natural ecosystems, but arbitrarily stipulates a fixed $50 per person 
willingness to pay to “protect natural habitats” regardless of the antici-
pated impact.10
The consequence of these omissions and stipulations is almost cer-
tainly to underestimate, by a large margin, the monetary cost of cli-
mate change.  Consider the fact that in 2004 alone, federal, state, and 
local governments in the United States spent over $1.4 billion to pro-
tect around 1340 entities (a mere thousandth of the threatened loss 
from climate change) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and 
expenditures have increased dramatically in recent years as more enti-
(2003) (“[T]he balance of evidence from . . . studies strongly suggests that a significant 
impact of global warming is already discernible in animal and plant populations.”). 
5 Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 NATURE 145, 145 
(2004). 
6 Climate change will harm all forms of nonhuman life in natural systems.  We fo-
cus on animals, however, because harm to animals will comprise the lion’s share of the 
social welfare costs stemming from destruction of natural systems. 
7 WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD:  ECONOMIC 
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 85-87 (2000). 
8 BJØRN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST:  MEASURING THE REAL 
STATE OF THE WORLD 290-300 (2001) (omitting animals from a discussion “of the con-
sequences of global warming”). 
9 NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW:  THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 169-73, 
173-88 (2007).  A prepublication version of the Stern Review is available at  
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/indepenent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/ 
stern_review_report.cfm. 
10 Richard S.J. Tol, Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change, 21 ENVT’L. & RE-
SOURCE ECON. 47, 54-55 (2002).  Tol himself notes the importance of better analysis in 
the area.  Id. at 55. 
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ties have been added to the endangered list.11  Moreover, an expendi-
ture measure may well underestimate the true value of endangered 
species protection, since most of the costs of the ESA are compliance 
and opportunity costs, stemming from the inability of landowners or 
governments to engage in otherwise valuable projects.  One study es-
timates that the true annual cost of the ESA (and thus its implied 
minimum value) is six times greater than nominal government ex-
penditures12—implying an annual figure of $8.4 billion for 2004. 
A skeptic might try to justify the neglect of animal life in climate 
change policy analysis in two ways.  First, the value of nonhuman life—
and the ESA—is heavily debated, and any particular figure will be easy 
to question.  Second, scientific and conceptual uncertainty about cli-
mate and natural systems has clouded any attempt at quantification.  
In 1996, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
wrote: 
Perhaps the category in which losses from climate change could be 
among the largest, yet where past research has been the most limited, is 
that of ecosystem impacts.  Uncertainties arise both because of the un-
known character of ecosystem impacts, and because of the difficulty of 
assessing these impacts from a socioeconomic point of view and translat-
ing them into welfare costs.
13
In this Article, we contend that neither of these reasons can justify 
the failure to take account of the effects of climate change on animals.  
First, animal life matters, both for its own sake and because human be-
ings care about it.  As noted above, the United States spends billions 
of dollars to protect a relatively small number of species under the 
ESA.  Contingent valuation studies consistently show high willingness 
to pay for the protection of animals.  Other recent studies have sug-
gested highly significant instrumental value for biodiversity in areas 
such as agriculture and medical research.  Second, the scientific un-
certainty over the impact of climate change on natural systems is rap-
11 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERAL AND STATE ENDANGERED  
AND THREATENED SPECIES EXPENDITURES:  FISCAL YEAR 2004, at ii, 1, 7 tbl.c (2006), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/expenditures/reports/FWS% 
20Endangered%20Species%202004%20Expenditures%20Report.pdf. 
12 RANDY T. SIMMONS & KIMBERLY FROST, PROP. & ENV’T RESEARCH CTR., AC-
COUNTING FOR SPECIES:  THE TRUE COSTS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 16 (2004), 
available at http://www.perc.org/pdf/esa_costs.pdf. 
13 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], WORKING GROUP III, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995:  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 200 
(James P. Bruce et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter IPCC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMEN-
SIONS]. 
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idly diminishing.  Many of the most important discoveries have been 
made only in the past few years, so previous analysts may have been 
right to assume that scientific knowledge was insufficient to permit 
precise judgments about damages or causality.  But the most extreme 
claims of causal ambiguity are no longer tenable.  While it is an under-
statement to say that the magnitude of the effects of climate change 
on animals is still debated, the direction and general significance of 
those effects are not.  Climate change will impose enormous costs on 
nonhuman life, and ignoring these costs while evaluating climate 
change policy is no longer excusable. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I surveys the recent scien-
tific literature that identifies the potential impact of climate change 
on animals and other nonhuman life.  Part II explores why and how 
animal welfare might be counted in the evaluation of climate change 
regulation.  Part III offers a partial and highly tentative estimate of the 
monetized loss from the impact of climate change on nonhuman life.  
Even under conservative assumptions, focused solely on extinctions 
and excluding other kinds of animal suffering and death, we estimate 
that this loss will run into the hundreds of billions annually.  Despite the 
tentativeness of the particular number, the unambivalent conclusion is 
that the prevailing estimates of the costs of climate change must be 
dramatically increased.   
I.  SOME EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
The fact of anthropogenic climate change is no longer in serious 
dispute.14  Carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere have risen to a 
level probably unseen in millions of years.15  Global temperatures have 
increased by 0.6°C in the twentieth century, and have been projected 
to increase an additional 1.4°C to 5.8°C for the period from 1990 to 
2100.  Sea levels rose by 0.10 to 0.20 m in the twentieth century, and 
are expected to rise an additional 0.09 to 0.88 m in the next hundred 
14 See, e.g., ANDREW E. DESSLER & EDWARD A. PARSON, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS 
OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 76 (2006) (“We can conclude with high confidence that 
human greenhouse-gas emissions are the dominant cause of [the] rapid recent warm-
ing.”); JOHN HOUGHTON, GLOBAL WARMING:  THE COMPLETE BRIEFING 9 (3d ed. 2004) 
(explaining that human activities are causing a warmer climate); IPCC, WORKING 
GROUP I, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:  THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 5-9 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 
2001) [hereinafter IPCC, SCIENTIFIC BASIS] (reviewing the effects of human activities 
on climate change). 
15 R.T. Pierrehumbert, Climate Change:  A Catastrophe in Slow Motion, 6 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 573, 576 (2006). 
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years.16  Extreme weather events may begin to occur with increasing 
frequency.17  Perhaps most ominously, some scientists have hypothe-
sized that disruptions to the ocean’s thermohaline circulation due to 
warming of polar waters might perversely trigger an abrupt and mas-
sive cooling event.18
These climatic shifts are expected to have a series of negative ef-
fects on human society.  Agriculture will suffer from temperature 
changes and extreme weather events.  Human health will decline, as 
cases of heat stress increase and diseases such as malaria spread to 
previously inaccessible regions.  Cities such as Venice might be dam-
aged or destroyed by changes in sea level.19
There is significant debate, however, about the proper accounting 
for these potential harms, especially as they pertain to the United 
States.  William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, for example, report that 
the net cost of gradual climate change to the United States, under 
moderate scenarios, might be “close to zero” because of adaptive re-
sponses.20  Robert Mendelsohn and James Neumann conclude that 
climate change will create net benefits in the United States—largely by 
boosting agricultural production.21  In contrast, Samuel Fankhauser 
and Richard Tol both find that climate change will cause more than 
$60 billion in annual costs to the United States.22  Some estimates are 
much higher.23  The most recent IPCC panel took a quite different 
16 IPCC, SCIENTIFIC BASIS, supra note 14, at 664, 665 fig.11.9, 671.  
17 STERN, supra note 9, at 59, 99-101, 107, 151; David R. Easterling et al., Climate 
Extremes:  Observations, Modeling, and Impacts, 289 SCIENCE 2068, 2068 (2000). 
18 R.B. Alley et al., Abrupt Climate Change, 299 SCIENCE 2005, 2008 (2003). 
19 NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 7, at 85; see also IPCC, WORKING GROUP I, CLI-
MATE CHANGE 2007:  THE PHYSICIAL SCIENCE BASIS 7 (2007) (predicting a significant 
rise in the sea level), available at http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/ 
AR4WG1_SPM.pdf.  
20 NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 7, at 97. 
21 Robert Mendelsohn & James E. Neumann, Synthesis and Conclusions, in THE IM-
PACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 315, 321 (Robert Mendel-
sohn & James E. Neumann eds., 1999); see also Olivier Deschênes & Michael Green-
stone, The Economic Impacts of Climate Change:  Evidence from Agricultural Profits and 
Random Fluctuations in Weather 26 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 04-26, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=564722. 
22 SAMUEL FANKHAUSER, VALUING CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE ECONOMICS OF THE 
GREENHOUSE 55 tbl.3.15 (1995); Richard S.J. Tol, The Damage Costs of Climate Change 
Toward More Comprehensive Calculations, 5 ENVT’L. & RESOURCE ECON. 353, 355 tbl.1 
(1995); see also STERN, supra note 9, at 130 (noting that the impact on U.S. GDP may 
range from a 1.2% loss to a 1% gain). 
23 Claudia Kemfert, Global Climate Protection:  Immediate Action Will Avert High Costs, 
1 DIW WEEKLY REP. 135, 135 (2005) (predicting global damages of $20 trillion by 
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approach:  by shifting its focus from evaluation of costs to mitigation 
of costs, the panel implicitly assumed that the impact of climate 
change justified attempts to mitigate its effects regardless of the costs.24
Notably missing from the debate about the costs of climate 
change, however, has been an accounting of its potential impact on 
nonhuman life.  As noted above, this is in part due to scientific uncer-
tainty.  In 1996, the IPCC emphasized the “unknown character” of po-
tential ecosystem impacts.25  A string of recent studies, however, has 
served to reduce this uncertainty. 
Consider one finding:  a global pattern of “poleward” shifts in 
habitat range has emerged across ecosystems.26  As temperatures have 
increased globally, species have been forced to move to cooler re-
gions; climate change thus acts as a source of human-induced habitat 
loss.  A recent study found that climate change caused an average 6.1 
km per-decade poleward shift in range during the twentieth century.  
The previous per-decade shift would be magnified as a result of the 
even greater temperature change predicted for the twenty-first cen-
tury.  Of course, if new regions and ecosystems were always perfect and 
accessible substitutes for a species’ old habitat, then there would be no 
negative impact from such range shifting.  (Even if so, many individual 
animals would suffer and die.)  But shifting is generally imperfect:  
climate change can move faster than species, natural or human-made 
barriers can prevent shifting, and geographically contiguous habitats 
are sometimes simply ecologically unsuitable.27
Climate change has also caused a chronological shift in “spring 
events,” such as migrant arrival and nesting dates.  Such events are oc-
curring earlier in the season:  a 2.3 day per-decade shift has been 
demonstrated in a study of 172 species.28  As with range shifts, this 
change need not have a direct negative effect; going to work an hour 
earlier is not intrinsically harmful.  But many species have behavioral 
patterns, such as migration, that are not linked to seasonal tempera-
2100); Frank Ackerman & Ian J. Finlayson, The Economics of Inaction on Climate Change:  
A Sensitivity Analysis 16-19 (Global Dev. & Envt’l. Inst., Working Paper No. 06-07, 2006) 
(concluding that minor changes to assumptions within Nordhaus’s DICE model could 
significantly alter the model’s estimated damages from climate change). 
24 See LOMBORG, supra note 8, at 301. 
25 See IPCC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 13, at 200. 
26 Parmesan & Yohe, supra note 4, at 41. 
27 See Thomas et al., supra note 4, at 147 (discussing the possibility of climate-
related extinction due to the inability of some “species to reach new climatically suit-
able areas”). 
28 See Parmesan & Yohe, supra note 4, at 38. 
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ture change.  If chronological shifting is either absent or imperfectly 
linked to temperature, animals will suffer as they attempt to feed, 
breed, and raise their young in excessively warm or rainy seasonal 
conditions.29
Species that cannot adjust to climate change, either geographi-
cally or chronologically, face a number of severe difficulties.  Heat is a 
direct stressor of animal physiology.30  Rising temperatures affect the 
availability of vegetation and food necessary for survival.31  Various bio-
logical mechanisms affected by temperature—such as nesting and 
mating—go haywire under abnormal temperature conditions.32  Dis-
eases triggered by threshold climate events become more common 
and deadly.33  And species must expend more time and energy on 
thermoregulation when their climatic environment is suboptimal.34
Extreme weather events and abrupt climate change also hit ani-
mals hard.  Even aside from direct storm damage, periods of abnormal 
precipitation or drought can have adverse behavioral and physiologi-
cal consequences on species ranging from elephants to turtles.35  The 
most recent incident of abrupt climate change stemming from disrup-
tion of the ocean’s thermohaline circulation system—the Younger 
Dryas event 10,000 to 11,000 years ago—led to catastrophic ecosystem 
disruption and mass extinction.36
29 See, e.g., Christiaan Both & Marcel E. Visser, Adjustment to Climate Change Is Con-
strained by Arrival Date in a Long-Distance Migrant Bird, 411 NATURE 296, 297 (2001) (dis-
cussing the negative effects of improper chronological shifting on the population of 
certain long-distance migrant birds). 
30 See William R. Dawson, Physiological Responses of Animals to Higher Temperatures, in 
GLOBAL WARMING AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 158, 158-62 (Robert L. Peters & Thomas 
E. Lovejoy eds., 1992). 
31 See Kevin M. Johnston & Oswald J. Schmitz, Wildlife and Climate Change:  Assessing 
the Sensitivity of Selected Species to Simulated Doubling of Atmospheric CO2, 3 GLOBAL CHANGE 
BIOLOGY 531, 539 fig.4 (1997) (illustrating that a doubling of atmospheric CO2 would 
have significant indirect effects on species distribution within the United States). 
32 See, e.g., M.E. Visser et al., Warmer Springs Lead to Mistimed Reproduction in Great 
Tits (Parus Major), 265 PROC.:  BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1867, 1869-70 (1998) (discussing the 
intensification of “selection for early [egg] laying” in great tits spurred by rising spring-
time temperatures). 
33 See Pounds et al., supra note 1, at 161 (“As temperatures rise, climate fluctua-
tions may cross thresholds for certain pathogens, triggering outbreaks.  Many diseases 
are expected to become more lethal, or to spread more readily, as the Earth warms.”). 
34 Arthur E. Dunham & Karen L. Overall, Population Responses to Environmental 
Change:  Life History Variation, Individual-Based Models, and the Population Dynamics of 
Short-Lived Organisms, 34 AM. ZOOLOGIST 382, 392-93 (1994). 
35 Easterling et al., supra note 17, at 2073. 
36 See Alley et al., supra note 18, at 2007-08 (“Local extinctions and extensive eco-
system disruptions occurred . . . in fewer than 50 years following the end of the 
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One study modeled the expected impact of gradual climate 
change on 1103 species (including mammals, birds, reptiles, and in-
sects) and predicted that a remarkable 15% to 37% would be commit-
ted to extinction by 2050.37  In contrast, over that same period, global 
habitat loss—the other major source of ecosystem destruction—leads 
to projected extinction ranges from 1% to 29% in the model, with a 
figure in the lower end of that range being most plausible.38  That is, 
climate change might very well be more destructive to nonhuman life 
than all other sources of habitat loss combined.  The lead researcher of the 
relevant study has stated that “well over a million species could be 
threatened with extinction as a result of climate change.”39  In com-
parison, the 1340 entities protected by the ESA are but a drop in the 
biodiversity bucket. 
While such projections are becoming increasingly common, a 
great deal of scientific uncertainty remains, and the concrete estimates 
detailed above have been subject to many criticisms.40  The models 
used to make climate change impact projections, like all models, are 
simplifications of the real world.41  The fact of causation is not seri-
ously disputed, but the precise causal mechanisms for observed and 
anticipated species loss have been difficult to identify.42  In addition, 
the specific regions and species surveyed might not be representative 
Younger Dryas cold event . . . .”); Dorothy Peteet, Sensitivity and Rapidity of Vegetational 
Response to Abrupt Climate Change, 97 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 1359, 1359-60 (2000) 
(discussing patterns of vegetational change that followed the Younger Dryas event). 
37 Thomas et al., supra note 5, at 145.  The 15% projection is associated with low 
climate change scenarios for 2050 (i.e., an 0.8°C-1.7°C increase in global tempera-
ture).  The 37% projection is associated with high climate change scenarios (i.e., an 
increase of more than 2.0°C).  Id. at 147. 
38 Id. at 146. 
39 Press Release, Univ. of Leeds, Climate Change Threatens a Million Species  
with Extinction (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/media/current/ 
extinction.htm (internal quotation marks omitted). 
40 See, e.g., Richard J. Ladle et al., Dangers of Crying Wolf over Risk of Extinctions, 428 
NATURE 799, 799 (2004) (criticizing media coverage of conservation research for its 
damaging oversimplification of the scientific findings). 
41 An alternative and recently released extinction study takes a different approach 
than the Thomas study, using expected loss of vegetation as a proxy for extinction.  Jay 
R. Malcolm et al., Global Warming and Extinctions of Endemic Species from Biodiversity Hot-
spots, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 538, 539-50 (2006).  The reported extinction range is 
less than 1% to 43%.  Id. at 542.  We focus on the Thomas figures because the Malcolm 
study is likely to underreport extinctions, since it analyzes biodiversity effects only when 
a vegetation class changes. 
42 See J. Alan Pounds & Robert Puschendorf, Clouded Futures, 427 NATURE 107, 108 
(2004) (“[F]ew studies have examined how climatic changes might be linked to the 
immediate causes of [species decline].”). 
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of the global pattern of risk.  Finally, as in previous periods of catas-
trophic ecosystem disruption, new species will eventually move in to 
replace the old,43 and some animals are even predicted to benefit 
from climate change.44  It is indisputable, however, that many animals 
will not be so lucky.  Like human beings, animals will be affected by 
climate change.  But more so than with human beings, the harms to 
animals are already apparent, scientifically clear, and of first-order 
significance. 
The question that remains is how to take account of this harm in 
policymaking.  Some might be inclined to treat it as irrelevant, but 
that inclination would be extremely difficult to defend in principle.  
On any plausible view, harm to animals matters, at least to some de-
gree.  This judgment is firmly reflected in American law.  At the na-
tional level, the ESA is complemented by the Animal Welfare Act,45 
which is designed to protect a wide range of animals against suffering 
and premature death.  Every state attempts to accomplish the same 
goal through anticruelty laws.  We now turn to competing understand-
ings of how, exactly, human societies should account for the interests 
of animals. 
II.  ACCOUNTING FOR ANIMALS 
In sketching the effects of climate change, we have emphasized 
the loss of species as such.  In doing so, we follow the scientific litera-
ture.  But there are actually two separate interests here.  The first is 
species loss; the second is the suffering and death of individual ani-
mals.  Both are important, though not for the same reasons, and the 
43 The rate of new speciation, however, is exceedingly low—a mere three species 
per year—relative to the anticipated annual losses due to climate change.  See J. John 
Sepkoski, Jr., Rates of Speciation in the Fossil Record, 353 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL 
SOC’Y. B 315, 315 (1998). 
44 For examples of species that might benefit from climate change, see Johnston & 
Schmitz, supra note 31, at 537-38.  Even if some species benefit from climatic warming, 
current extinction rates—even aside from climate change—far exceed baseline rates of 
new speciation.  Substitution and replacement of animals or species thus will not pro-
ceed at a pace that implicates the social costs of climate change within a foreseeable 
timeframe.  See EDWARD O. WILSON, BIOPHILIA 122 (1984) (“[T]he current rate [of 
extinction] is still the greatest in recent geological history.  It is also much higher than 
the rate of production of new species by ongoing evolution, so that the net result is a 
steep decline in the world’s standing diversity.”); Stuart L. Pimm et al., The Future of 
Biodiversity, 269 SCIENCE 347, 348-49 (1995) (predicting increasing rates of extinction 
in the future). 
45 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (2000). 
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second deserves independent attention.  If one thousand polar bears 
or tigers are condemned to extended periods of distress followed by 
premature death, their suffering and death would matter even if many 
polar bears and tigers remain. 
To be sure, the loss of a species is generally counted as an inde-
pendent harm—in part because of the ecological and medicinal func-
tions that species provide, and in part because human beings want the 
opportunity to be able to see and enjoy biological diversity.46  As we 
shall see, human beings are willing to pay significant amounts to pro-
tect endangered species.  But our broader interest here is in harms 
done to individual animals.  Compare, for example, the loss of the last 
five harlequin frogs with the loss of one thousand polar bears.  In our 
view, the latter loss is far worse, because it involves so much more in 
the way of suffering and death.  More generally, we believe that much 
of social policy has been unduly focused on extinction, to the neglect 
of the effects on individual animals.  From the moral point of view, 
threats to both endangered and nonendangered species should mat-
ter to climate change policy. 
A.  Intrinsic and Instrumental Value 
The most straightforward reason to account for animals is that 
their interests are intrinsically important.  A version of this view was 
held by Jeremy Bentham, who compared disregard for animal welfare 
to slavery.  In 1789, the year of the ratification of America’s Bill of 
Rights, Bentham argued: 
The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire 
those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by 
the hand of tyranny.  The French have already discovered that the 
blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be aban-
doned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor . . . . [A] full-grown 
horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more 
conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, 
old.  But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the ques-
tion is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?47
46 See Gardner M. Brown Jr. & Jason F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species 
Act, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 11-13 (1998) (detailing the private and social benefits derived 
from species protection). 
47 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 311 n.1 (Pro-
metheus Books 1988) (1789). 
  
1706 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1695 
 
In Bentham’s view, utility is what matters, and because animals are ca-
pable of suffering, they deserve to count in the social calculus.  Utili-
tarianism is, of course, highly controversial.  Perhaps we should accept 
a form of welfarism48 not tied to the contested metric of utility, or in-
stead emphasize capabilities49 or even rights.50  We do not mean here 
to endorse any particular theory of why animal life matters.  Whatever 
the proper account, it is widely agreed that animals should count in 
the social calculus.  On this point, there is an incompletely theorized 
agreement—an agreement in support of judgments and practices, 
amidst disagreement or uncertainty about what accounts for them.51  
Millions of Americans treat their dogs and cats as beloved family 
members whose interests count independently of the interests of hu-
man beings.  Many more agree that animal suffering should be re-
duced, even if the reduction promises no clear gain for humans.  Call 
this position the intrinsic value approach, because it seeks to protect 
animal welfare for its own sake, rather than because animals are a tool 
for the ends of human beings. 
Of course, many human practices treat animals as worth little or 
nothing, or as solely of instrumental value.  Consider, for example, the 
use of animals for food, and in particular the harm imposed on ani-
mals by factory farms—where chickens have their beaks seared off, 
cows and pigs are castrated without anaesthetic, and veal calves are 
chained down in tiny crates for the duration of their short and miser-
able lives.52  In many contexts, animal life is valued only to the extent 
that human beings benefit from it. 
To be sure, social practices cannot dispose of the normative ques-
tion.  Bentham himself believed that the infliction of suffering is a 
prima facie wrong, not to be justified by its pervasiveness;53 we agree 
with him.  But many people continue to act as if some, most, or all 
animal life has largely or solely instrumental value, in a way that would 
raise questions about the extent of human responsibility for their 
48 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 54-86 (1999). 
49 Martha Nussbaum has applied a capabilities approach to nonhuman animals.  
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE:  DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEM-
BERSHIP 346-407 (2006). 
50 See GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS:  YOUR CHILD OR THE 
DOG? (2000); TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983).   
51 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 4-7 (1996) 
(outlining the concept and virtues of “incompletely theorized agreements”). 
52 See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 95-157 (2d ed. 1990). 
53 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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deaths and suffering—especially, perhaps, with respect to animals in 
distant lands.  Even this view, however, acknowledges that animals can 
have value—sometimes significant value—and under the instrumental 
approach, that value must be included in assessments of social policy. 
B.  Monetary Valuation 
Whether animals are to be valued intrinsically or instrumentally, 
difficult issues remain.  In the context of human life and health, 
American agencies assign monetary values on the basis of private “will-
ingness to pay.”54  For example, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) values a human life at about $6.1 million, a figure that comes 
from real-world markets.55  Human life has intrinsic as well as instru-
mental value, and risks to human life can be monetized.  In the work-
place and for consumer goods, additional safety has a price; market 
evidence has been investigated to identify that price.  The $6.1 million 
figure, known as the value of a statistical life (VSL), is a product of 
studies of actual workplace risks, attempting to determine how much 
workers and others are paid to assume mortality hazards.  Suppose 
that people must be paid $600, on average, to eliminate risks of 1 in 
10,000.  If so, the VSL would be said to be $6 million.  Where market 
evidence is unavailable, agencies often produce monetary valuations 
on the basis of contingent valuation surveys, which ask people how 
much they are willing to pay to eliminate or reduce certain risks.  
Drawing on market evidence and contingent valuation studies, the 
EPA has recently valued a case of chronic bronchitis at $260,000, an 
emergency hospital visit for asthma at $9000, a hospital admission for 
pneumonia at $13,400, a lost workday at $83, and a specified decrease 
in vision at $14.56
Can similar tools be used to determine the value of a statistical life 
for animals?  No labor markets are available to provide compensating 
differential studies of mortality risk.  A contingent valuation study 
based on the preferences of animals would be infeasible.  Polar bears 
do not have money, and they cannot tell us how much they care about 
54 See W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS:  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES 
FOR RISK 19-21 (1992) (detailing the “willingness to pay” approach and its application 
to public versus private contexts). 
55 See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:  ON KNOWING THE PRICE 
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 61, 75-84 (2004) (discussing the “wage-
risk” studies from which the $6.1 million figure was derived). 
56 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE:  THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY 
PROTECTION 145 tbl.A-3 (2002). 
  
1708 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1695 
 
Arctic sea ice.  We might be tempted to apply existing market and 
contingent valuation studies to animals, valuing them at some fraction 
of human beings.  But if so, an appropriate scaling factor would have 
to be determined, and any such factor might well seem arbitrary.  
What weight should a frog’s life or health have relative to that of a 
wolf, eagle, or human being? 
An alternative approach is to value animals by reference to human 
preferences, turned into monetary equivalents.  Economists typically 
make the relevant assessments by inquiring into use and nonuse 
value—a division that corresponds closely to the distinction between 
instrumental and intrinsic value.  Use value includes, for example, the 
ecosystem services provided by natural life (e.g., pollination by butter-
flies and bees), the value of biodiversity for agriculture and medical 
research, and the recreational value of observing natural wildlife.  
Nonuse value reflects the pure “existence” value of animals or species 
(such as the value people place on simply knowing that some polar 
bears will survive), and the “option” value of knowing that animals, in-
cluding some members of endangered species, are available for future 
use.  Neither use nor nonuse value need be particularly controver-
sial,57 even from the perspective of committed opponents of animal 
rights.  If people care about animals and are willing to pay to protect 
them, then animals should matter in policy regardless of their moral 
status. 
The economic approach to valuation of animals raises many ques-
tions.  Is the value of animals, or species, adequately captured by hu-
man willingness to pay for their protection?  Imagine a society in 
which existence value was effectively zero.  We might well reject the 
moral judgments of the people in that society and refuse to believe 
that those judgments should be the basis for policy and law.  Those in-
clined to accept this objection might nonetheless agree that, when ex-
istence value is positive, it should be included in the overall calculus.  
But if people’s willingness to pay does not reflect the proper valuation 
of animals, it is not easy to identify the proper response.  Perhaps the 
figures should result from processes of democratic deliberation, not 
from market evidence.  But whatever its source, any monetary valua-
57 The idea of existence value raises several puzzles.  For example, it makes the 
value of an animal or species depend on the human population size.  But plausibly that 
value, to human beings, does increase with the size of the human population.  For a 
discussion of other concerns about the concept of existence value, see David A. Dana, 
Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 349-53 
(2004). 
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tion of animals will inevitably be made by human beings.  At the very 
least, we believe that use, existence, and option value, to the extent 
that they can be elicited, are legitimate parts of the climate change 
debate, and that they should be incorporated rather than neglected. 
Even if this conclusion is accepted, there are severe implementa-
tion difficulties in determining the relevant monetary values.  As we 
shall see, serious efforts have been made to generate monetary figures 
for the use value of species.  But when the use value of animals is a 
public or common good, reliable market mechanisms are unavailable 
for translation into monetary benefits.  For nonuse value, the ordinary 
instrument consists of contingent valuation studies, and we shall make 
use of such studies here.  But such studies raise many problems and, if 
not designed carefully, will produce implausible answers.  In the cli-
mate change context, the possibility of small errors is especially impor-
tant:  when one is talking about millions of species, even miniscule 
changes in the species- or individual-level analysis will lead to dramatic 
changes in the estimated social value or cost. 
Valuation difficulties of this sort, however, are not reasons for ig-
noring the relevant costs entirely, particularly when the stakes are 
large.  Just as scientific uncertainty has been reduced over time, so too 
has the conceptual uncertainty about the accuracy of various methods 
of nonmarket valuation.  If there is a gap in the analysis of climate 
change and animals, it is a gap in the literature, not in the availability 
of relevant facts or conceptual tools.  Our initial submission is that 
losses of animal life should play a significant role in the debate.  Let us 
attempt, then, to make some progress on the question of monetiza-
tion. 
III.  THE (ANIMAL) COSTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
We provide here a tentative estimate of some of the social welfare 
costs of climate change on nonhuman life, focusing on human valua-
tions.  Because of empirical and conceptual difficulties, we do not in-
sist on any particular figures.58  Instead, we offer ranges designed to 
capture the monetized value of merely one component of social loss:  
the loss of endangered species.  The foregoing discussion should be 
58 Indeed, one of us is generally skeptical of cost-benefit analysis as a decision 
mechanism in environmental regulation; the other is a defender of considering the 
outcome of that analysis, without making it decisive.  See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
RISK AND REASON, at ix-x (2002) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis should be used 
along with other measures to assess the consequences of regulation). 
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enough to show that this loss cannot possibly capture the full value of 
harms to animals as a result of climate change.  If suffering and death 
matter, then animals that belong to nonendangered species matter as 
well, and the resulting losses will not be included in our analysis.  But 
monetization of the loss of species presents the more tractable ques-
tions, because we have some information about the number of species 
at risk and the human valuation of species loss.  Our exclusion of ani-
mal death and suffering means that our ultimate figures will be far too 
low. 
We have two minimal goals, one substantive and the other meth-
odological.  The first is to show that the numbers are high and that 
they need to be considered in assessing the losses from climate 
change.  The second is to present some of the difficulties—normative, 
conceptual, and empirical—involved in assigning monetary values to 
those losses. 
A.  Extinctions 
Our analysis focuses, in particular, on the 15%-37% projected ex-
tinction rate noted above.59  Given the importance of this estimate, 
some discussion of its nature and plausibility is warranted.  Quantita-
tive projections of the global impact of climate change are necessarily 
difficult.60  This is true even of its impact on economic systems, where 
data are abundant.  But it is even harder for natural systems.  The sci-
entific community lacks a clear measure of the number of species,61 
and determining how each will be affected by climate change is thus a 
herculean task.  The approach used in extinction studies in biology 
focuses on generic species-area relationships (SAR), rather than spe-
cific causal mechanisms.  The key assumption is that there is a system-
atic relationship between habitable area and survival.  While this 
method has received some criticism,62 it is firmly established in the 
biological field. 
59 Thomas et al., supra note 5, at 145. 
60 See Pounds & Puschendorf, supra note 42, at 108 (noting that models might not 
capture key climatic changes). 
61 See IUCN SPECIES SURVIVAL COMM’N, 2004 IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPE-
CIES:  A GLOBAL SPECIES ASSESSMENT 6-9 (Jonathan E.M. Baillie et al. eds., 2004) (not-
ing “the high degree of uncertainty surrounding” the number of species). 
62 See, e.g., LOMBORG, supra note 8, at 254-55 (arguing that SAR analyses overstate 
the likelihood of extinction); Owen T. Lewis, Climate Change, Species-Area Curves and the 
Extinction Crisis, 361 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 163, 164-70 (2006) (discussing 
the complications of applying SAR methods to climate change). 
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This method can be applied to climate change because global 
warming has the effect of reducing the habitable area of most species.  
Using recently released climate change data, Thomas and his coau-
thors determine “climate envelope[s]”—climatic conditions under 
which particular species can survive—and predict how changes to 
these envelopes reduce effective habitat size.63  These predictions 
show that while the climatic stress for any particular animal in any par-
ticular year is small, the yearly and global accumulation of habitat loss 
leads to massive long-run consequences.  If human beings impose a 
small stress on the habitat of every animal on the planet, but do so 
every year over a period of many decades, many of the animals will 
eventually die off. 
There are, however, potential problems with our use of the extinc-
tion projections from Thomas and his coauthors, and these should be 
noted at the outset.  First, there is the question of representativeness.  
The 1103 species examined by Thomas and his coauthors—while an 
immense, joint scientific endeavor—nonetheless represent a miniscule 
portion of the total number of species.64  The 20% of the terrestrial 
Earth sampled by this study, moreover, might not accurately reflect 
the other 80%.  But in the absence of good reasons to think that gen-
eralization is flawed, reliance on these methods remains plausible.  If 
we are to make some assumption about the expected losses, it is surely 
better to use the best available figure—representativeness concerns 
acknowledged—than no figure at all.65
Second, and even more fundamentally, the 15%-37% extinction 
rate gives us no information about the number or distribution of spe-
cies, or the total number of animals at risk.  This information is vital to 
a sound analysis, because the absolute number (and characteristics) of 
creatures is significant, whether intrinsic or instrumental value is em-
phasized.  Human beings are undoubtedly willing to spend more to 
save some species than to save others, and they are more willing to 
save large numbers of animals than small numbers.  Our own treat-
ment pays no attention to species-specific characteristics (which might 
bias our findings upwards or downwards), or to the absolute numbers 
63 Thomas et al., supra note 5, at 145. 
64 See Ladle et al., supra note 40, at 799 (noting the limitations of such a small 
sample size). 
65 A recent study published in Nature suggests that global patterns of species rich-
ness are highly correlated across taxons, indicating that representativeness concerns 
may not be very significant.  John F. Lamoreux et al., Global Tests of Biodiversity Concor-
dance and the Importance of Endemism, 440 NATURE 212, 213 (2006). 
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of organisms (rather than species).  These are, admittedly, serious 
omissions on both fronts. 
More specific information, however, is difficult to come by.  Ap-
proximately 1.55 million species have been described and counted to 
date, but many more remain undiscovered.66  Projections of the total 
number of species range from five to fifty million,67 with a recent study 
suggesting that a lower figure is possible.68  In terms of taxonomic dis-
tribution, vertebrates comprise a comparatively small 57,739 of the 
1.55 million known species.69  The vast majority of species are arthro-
pods70—which are a small portion of the Thomas sample (79 of 1103 
species, 69 of which are butterfly species).71  Finally, the absolute 
number of animals is virtually impossible to estimate; it is difficult to 
estimate population sizes of species that are not known to exist!  To 
say the least, uncertainty of this sort is important. 
A third problem with the 15%-37% figure is that it provides no 
guidance as to the timing of extinctions.  If we are speaking about hu-
man valuations, losing polar bears tomorrow would presumably be 
worse than losing them a hundred years from now.72  But the SAR 
models do not estimate the date of extinction, only its inevitability.  A 
predicted extinction thus might occur tomorrow, in 2050, or in 2100. 
Fortunately, the estimation methods we use below partially ac-
count for this chronological uncertainty.  (The exception is the “use” 
value estimate, as we discuss below.)  For example, the contingent 
valuation results on which we rely ask individuals how much they value 
the prevention of a negative change in a threatened species’ popula-
tion, rather than its immediate extinction. Similarly, the ESA expendi-
tures we use for our “revealed preference” analysis are incurred to 
66 IUCN SPECIES SURVIVAL COMM’N, supra note 61, at 7 tbl.2.1, 8. 
67 Robert M. May, How Many Species Are There on Earth?, 241 SCIENCE 1441, 1441 
(1988). 
68 Vojtech Novotny et al., Low Host Specificity of Herbivorous Insects in a Tropical Forest, 
416 NATURE 841, 843 (2002) (revising current estimates to approximately five million). 
69
 IUCN SPECIES SURVIVAL COMM’N, supra note 61, at 7 tbl.2.1. 
70 Id. (stating that invertebrates account for 1.19 million of the 1.55 million total 
known species). 
71 Thomas et al., supra note 5, at 146 tbl.2. 
72 There is a significant debate, however, as to whether discounting is appropriate 
when it comes to human health and life.  Presumably, critics would be equally con-
cerned about discounting with animal life.  See Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 
YALE L.J. 1911, 1912 (1999) (arguing that timing is critical to discounting).  For a more 
in-depth discussion, see Symposium, Intergenerational Equity and Discounting, 74 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1 (Winter 2007). 
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prevent population losses and risks of extinction in the future.  If we 
conceive of the Thomas extinction rates as probabilistic risks that are 
imposed today, and find monetary measures that reflect risk rather 
than immediate extinction, then the discounting problem fades in 
importance.  If, for example, people are willing to pay twenty dollars 
now to reduce a one in ten thousand risk that will come to fruition in 
twenty years, then the resulting figure can be used without discount-
ing. 
Fourth, and as we have emphasized, extinction rates ignore the 
death and suffering of creatures that do not go extinct.  This will serve 
to bias our estimates downward, and significantly so.  Warming of po-
lar waters will have severe consequences for polar bears, even if it does 
not lead to their extinction.  An effort to calculate human use and 
nonuse value would take account of the relevant losses, to the extent 
that people cared about polar bear suffering, independent of extinc-
tion risk.  Global estimates of the suffering caused by climate change, 
however, are even harder to come by than death estimates.73  Such es-
timates would require close observation of every species, which is ob-
viously not possible when most species have not even been identified. 
Finally, the SAR models do not fully account for the expected 
costs of extreme weather events74 or abrupt climate change.  Again, 
this will serve only to bias our results downward. 
The upshot of this discussion is that, while there are significant 
problems in using the Thomas extinction measure, it remains a useful 
foundation for our analysis.  If we can obtain a monetary value from 
that measure, it will at least identify a component of the social loss 
from climate change. 
B.  Three Assumptions 
Before proceeding to our estimates, we describe three additional 
assumptions.  First, we rely throughout on a low-end assumption about 
the total number of species—five million.  (This is half the minimum 
number cited by Lomborg, for example.)  This figure provides a con-
73 E-mail from Chris D. Thomas, Professor of Conservation Biology, Univ. of York, 
to Wayne Hsiung (June 2, 2006) (on file with authors). 
74 The Thomas model accounts for differences in mean temperature related to 
extreme weather events, such as heat waves.  It does not, however, account for possible 
increases in storm activity, year-to-year temperature variance, and other changes in 
climate extremes.  Thomas, et al., supra note 5, at 147 (omitting these variables from 
the explanation of the climate scenario methodology). 
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servative baseline for evaluating the impact of climate change.75  The 
implication is that anywhere from 0.75 to 1.85 million species will be 
lost under climate change scenarios by 2050. 
Second, for calculations that are sensitive to taxonomic distribu-
tion, we assume that all vertebrate species have been identified.  Un-
der this assumption, the 57,739 figure cited above exhausts the uni-
verse of vertebrate species.  The alternative assumption is that 
vertebrates comprise the same proportion of unknown as known spe-
cies.  This approach would increase the estimate of vertebrate species 
from 57,739 to around 186,000.  The real number of vertebrate spe-
cies is somewhere between these two figures, but probably much 
closer to the former, as vertebrate species are more likely to be cur-
rently identified.76  In order to avoid speculation in an area in which 
biologists have little information, we conservatively assume that the 
57,739 figure is correct.  Relying on the 15%-37% extinction rate, we 
thus estimate that anywhere from 8700 to 21,400 vertebrates eventu-
ally will be lost under climate change scenarios by 2050.77
Finally, we assume a linear individual and social value function for 
species loss in all estimates.  If we are valuing animals for their own 
sake (i.e., intrinsically), then presumably each animal should count 
for approximately the same amount as the last.78  On the other hand, 
the correct value or cost function for instrumental value might be 
concave or convex, not linear, when it comes to species loss.  Concav-
ity would imply diminishing marginal utility for species protection.  
For example, if we conceive of species protection as a consumption 
good, we might decide, after spending money to protect polar bears 
and ring ouzels, that protecting harlequin frogs “just isn’t worth as 
much.”  Some experimental findings suggest that species protection is 
75 See LOMBORG, supra note 8, at 250 (asserting that ten to eighty million species is 
the current best estimate). 
76 See IUCN SPECIES SURVIVAL COMM’N, supra note 61, at 8 (calling vertebrates the 
“best evaluated group”). 
77 We assume that the extinction rate for fish will be similar to the extinction rates 
for other vertebrates.  Due to data limitations, Thomas and his coauthors examined 
only terrestrial vertebrate species; the impact of climate change on fish and other 
aquatic life, however, is not thought to be fundamentally divergent.  See, e.g., Catherine 
M. O’Reilly et al., Climate Change Decreases Aquatic Ecosystem Productivity of Lake Tangany-
ika, Africa, 424 NATURE 766, 768 (2003) (concluding that climate change has contrib-
uted to the lake’s diminished productivity); Allison L. Perry et al., Climate Change and 
Distribution Shifts in Marine Fishes, 308 SCIENCE 1912, 1912 (2005) (predicting that cli-
mate changes may strongly influence numbers and distribution of fish). 
78 There might be different population sizes across species, of course, but as noted 
previously, data on population size is hard to come by. 
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a “warm-glow” good—that individuals will pay a fixed amount, and 
only that fixed amount, to be part of a “good cause,” regardless of the 
expected consequences.79  Convexity, in contrast, would imply increas-
ing marginal costs for species loss.  If we conceive of species loss as a 
social harm, losing one species might not harm us much—and might 
not elicit a high marginal willingness to pay—but losing the millionth 
species would leave us in a biological wasteland.  It is unclear which 
effect should dominate, but we follow a default assumption of linear-
ity.  Ideally, contingent value surveys should be able to capture the 
curvature of the value or cost function, if any, but no studies to date 
that we are aware of have engaged in this line of research. 
C.  Estimates 
We now proceed to our estimation analysis.  We report values in 
two ways:  by 2005 U.S. dollars and by percentage of GDP.  The two 
measures have independent significance.  The former assumes that 
real willingness to pay will remain static in perpetuity.  The latter im-
plies that species protection will remain a fixed proportion of GDP—
that is, as income grows, willingness to pay will grow proportionately.  
Our hunch is that species protection, like health and environmental 
protection more generally, will comprise an increasing portion of 
GDP, both because species protection is likely to be a “luxury good” 
(i.e., we will spend proportionately more on it as our wealth in-
creases), and because species protection becomes more valuable as 
more species go extinct.  If that is true, then both of our reporting 
methods will underestimate true social costs. 
1.  Use Value Estimates 
Ecosystems provide immense value for human use.  The air we 
breathe, the soil we farm, the plants we harvest, and the water we 
drink all depend on ecosystem services.  A significant portion of this 
value is generated by biological sources. 
Two recent studies have estimated the value of natural systems for 
human use.  First, a 1997 study published in Nature estimated the total 
(and largely nonmarket) annual value of ecosystem services to be 
around $33 trillion—around twice the value of global GDP at the 
79 Tol, supra note 10, at 54-55. 
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time.80  Not all of this is generated by biological sources, but the ag-
gregate value is broken down by categories, such as food production, 
gas and climate regulation, water supply, and raw materials. 
Previous studies of climate change have accounted for at least 
some of this value.  For example, virtually every study of climate 
change has examined its impact on food production.  The categories 
relating to natural biological processes, however, have been ignored in 
climate change analysis.  At least four of these categories—pollination, 
biological control, habitat/refugia, and genetic resources—are com-
prised entirely of natural biological sources. 
 
Table 1:  Value of Biological Ecosystem Services to the World
81
 
Categories 
$US 2005  
(in billions) 
Pollination 154 
Biological Control 550 
Habitat/Refugia 164 
Genetic Resources 104 
World Total 973 
U.S. Total 280 
 
Summing these four totals, we obtain an annual value of biological 
services of $973 billion in 2005 dollars for the world.  Using the Tho-
mas extinction estimate of 15%-37%, the projected loss from climate 
change is thus $146 to $360 billion in annual value.  Excluding habi-
tat/refugia—which is arguably a “nonuse” value—the summed value is 
$809 billion in 2005 dollars, and the projected loss range is $121 to 
$299 billion.  If we assume that the United States receives a proportion 
of this use value equal to its proportion of 2005 global GDP, the pro-
jected loss for the United States alone ranges from $42 to $103 billion 
($35 to $86 billion if habitat/refugia is excluded) annually, or any-
where from 0.4% to 1.1% of annual U.S. GDP (0.4% to 0.9% if habi-
tat/refugia is excluded).82
 
80 Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capi-
tal, 387 NATURE 253, 259 (1997). 
81 These figures are derived from Costanza et al., supra note 80, at 256 tbl.2. 
82 All economic statistics are drawn from the Bureau of Econ. Analysis, National 
Income and Product Account Tables, available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/ 
dn/nipaweb/index.asp (last visited May 1, 2007).    The exception is the U.S. share of 
global GDP, which is taken from the CIA World Factbook.  See CIA—The World 
Factbook—United States, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ 
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This figure underestimates the true use value of nonhuman life 
because many categories of ecosystem services—such as erosion con-
trol, soil formation, and nutrient cycling—are of mixed biological and 
nonbiological origin. 
The second study we use, published in Bioscience in 1997, avoids 
this underinclusion problem by breaking down the value of all ecosys-
tem services (including services of mixed biological and nonbiological 
origin, such as soil formation) to which biological sources contribute.  
The reported annual value of biodiversity for the United States is $389 
billion in 2005 dollars, and $3.5 trillion for the world.83   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
us.html (last visited May 1, 2007).  U.S. GDP percentages are calculated with reference 
to the year of the study. 
83 Daniel Pimentel et al., Economic and Environmental Benefits of Biodiversity, 47 BIO-
SCIENCE 747, 748 tbl.2 (1997). 
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Table 2:  Value of Biodiversity to the United States and the World
84
 
$US 2005 (in  billions) 
Categories US World 
Waste Disposal 75.6 927.2 
Soil Formation 6.1 30.5 
Nitrogen Fixation 9.8 109.8 
Bioremediation of Chemicals 27.5 147.6 
Crop Breeding (Genetics) 24.4 140.3 
Livestock Breeding (Genetics) 24.4 48.8 
Biotechnology 3.1 7.3 
Biocontrol of Pests (Crops) 14.6 122.0 
Biocontrol of Pests (Forests) 6.1 73.2 
Host Plant Resistance (Crops) 9.8 97.6 
Host Plant Resistance (Forests) 1.0 13.4 
Perennial Grains (Potential) 20.7 207.4 
Pollination 48.8 244.0 
Fishing 35.4 73.2 
Hunting 14.6 30.5 
Seafood 3.1 100.0 
Other Wild Foods 0.6 219.6 
Wood Products 9.8 102.5 
Ecotourism 22.0 610.0 
Pharmaceuticals from Plants 24.4 102.5 
Forests Sequestering of CO2 7.3 164.7 
Total 389.2 3572.1 
 
 
 
 
Here, no exclusion is necessary for our estimate, since all of these 
values are from biological sources.  The projected loss from climate 
change is $58 to $144 billion—or 0.6% to 1.4% of GDP—in annual 
value for the United States (surprisingly close to the estimate sug-
gested by the Costanza et al. study cited in Table 1), and $539 to 
$1322 billion for the world.  Our estimates are summarized in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
84 Table 2 is adapted from id. 
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Table 3: Loss in Annual Biodiversity Use Value for the United States
85
 
World Value 
($US 2005, 
in billions) 
US Value  
($US 2005, 
in  billions) 
US  
%GDP 
Costanza 
Low Climate Change 121 35 0.4 
 
High Climate Change 299 86 0.9 
 Low Climate Change  
(Including Refugia) 146 42 0.4 
 High Climate Change  
(Including Refugia) 360 103 1.1 
     
Pimentel Low Climate Change* 539 58 0.6 
 
High Climate Change* 1322 144 1.4 
 
2.  Use Value Objections 
Three implicit assumptions of our analysis might be challenged.  
First, we assume that, in ex ante expectation, threatened species will 
not systematically differ in use value from nonthreatened species.  It 
might be argued, in contrast, that valuable species tend to be more 
durable, or more adapted to human society, and thus less susceptible 
to damage from climate change.  It seems rather unlikely that dogs or 
cats will be among the species extinguished by global warming. 
While a full empirical defense of this assumption would require an 
inquiry beyond the scope of this Article, we believe that our assump-
tion is at least plausible.  For one thing, we have no reason to suspect 
that value has any inherent correlation with durability or survivability.  
Furthermore, value need not imply adaptation to human society; in-
deed, many currently endangered species, such as some varieties of 
salmon and sturgeon, have been overused to the point of threatened 
status precisely because of their value. 
Second, and as noted above, we assume a linear value function.  
That is, the first generic species lost is no more or less valuable, from 
an ex ante perspective, than the last.  Thus, a 10% loss in species im-
85 Asterisks indicate best estimate.  “Low” and “high” refer to low- and high-end 
climate change scenarios for 2050.  See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
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plies a 10% loss in biological use value.  Some commentary, in con-
trast, has suggested that the biodiversity use value function is concave 
because of redundancies in biological resources.86  The value of biodi-
versity, under this view, is not heavily affected by the loss of a particu-
lar species, so long as there are biologically and genetically similar or-
ganisms that are not lost (i.e., the “genetic distance” between lost and 
surviving species is small).  For example, we might not care much 
about the first 109 species of harlequin frog, if we know that the 110th 
will survive. 
We have three responses to this objection.  First, if threats to bio-
logically similar organisms are correlated, as is surely the case, redun-
dancy need not make the value function concave over its entire do-
main, but rather simply discrete (e.g., a stepwise function that 
increases or decreases only at certain threshold points).  So long as we 
expect one class of organisms to be no more or less valuable than the 
next class, the linear approximation will be valid.  Second, more re-
cent commentary has challenged the “genetic distance” approach to 
valuing biodiversity because redundancy serves an insurance-like func-
tion against catastrophic loss.  For example, if some pathogen attacks 
harlequin frogs, we will be better off with 110 species than with just 
one, since the 110th species will be more likely to have some adaptive 
characteristic that will allow it to survive the threat.87  More generally, 
the fact that two species are very similar need not make them redun-
dant in value, if the small differences serve some vital function.  Fi-
nally, to the extent that species are ecologically interdependent, pro-
tection of one species will be required to protect many others.88  We 
acknowledge that if our assumption here is wrong, our figure must be 
diminished accordingly. 
A third implicit assumption in our analysis is that no adaptive re-
sponse is possible when a particular species is threatened.  It might be 
argued, in contrast, that once a valuable species is threatened, human 
society will act in an ad hoc fashion to prevent its loss.  The difficulty 
with this argument is that damage from climate change, unlike other 
86 For examples, see Brown & Shogren, supra note 46, at 11; Stephen Polasky & 
Andrew R. Solow, On the Value of a Collection of Species, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 298, 
298 (1993); Martin Weitzman, On Diversity, 107 Q. J. ECON. 363, 372-73 (1992). 
87 See William A. Brock & Anastasios Xepapadeas, Valuing Biodiversity from an Eco-
nomic Perspective:  A Unified Economic, Ecological, and Genetic Approach, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 
1597, 1601 (2003) (discussing this scenario as applied to plant life). 
88 See Pimentel et al., supra note 83, at 747 (arguing that the loss of a key species 
can cause the collapse of an ecosystem). 
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human-caused environmental damage, is hard to mitigate on a case-
by-case basis.  The harlequin frogs discussed in the Introduction pro-
vide an example of a species for which mitigation strategies have 
proven futile.89  Protecting habitat from human intrusion does little 
good if climate change has already undermined the viability of a crea-
ture’s habitat, and creating a biosphere or zoo for the world, with con-
trolled environments, is prohibitively costly. 
There are three other major sources of error in our estimates.  
First, we have failed to account for chronological uncertainty about 
species extinction.  This is inevitable since, as noted above, the SAR 
models provide no guidance about the timing of extinctions.  If a spe-
cies goes extinct in 2100, the loss in use value will be significantly less 
than if it goes extinct in 2007.  Suppose, as seems plausible, that most 
of the extinctions will occur later rather than earlier.  If so, the use of 
a standard discount rate—say, 3%—will significantly decrease the 
monetary figures above.  On the other hand, the use of the standard 
discount rate is contested, and it is by no means clear that it is appro-
priate.90
Second, our absolute value estimates ignore the possibility that 
improved technology will either reduce or amplify the value of biodi-
versity.  Both reduction and amplification are possible.  If synthetic 
substitutes are found, perhaps biodiversity will be less important than 
it is now.  On the other hand, the progress of genetic research may 
mean that we will find more and more valuable uses for biological re-
sources.91  The GDP measures simply assume that use value will grow 
in the same proportion as the other components of GDP, so that a 1% 
loss today implies a 1% loss in 2050. 
Finally, we assume that extinction is the only harm to global biodi-
versity.  In reality, if 90% of a species’ population is reduced, this will 
undermine use value nearly as much as extinction. 
89 See Pounds et al., supra note 1, at 161 (noting that harlequin frogs have suffered 
widespread decline despite habitat protection). 
90 See, e.g., STERN, supra note 10, at 49-59 (providing an overview of the discounting 
problem); Ackerman & Finlayson, supra note 23, at 2 (noting debate about the prob-
lem and its application); Robert C. Lind, Analysis for Intergenerational Decisionmaking, in 
DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 173, 176 (Paul R. Portney & John P. 
Weyant eds., 1999) (expressing skepticism about the use of the standard discount 
rate). 
91 See, e.g., Paulo Prada, Poisonous Tree Frog Could Bring Wealth to Tribe in Brazilian 
Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2006, at C1 (reporting ways in which frogs can be espe-
cially valuable for biotechnological research). 
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The first of these three errors suggests overestimation; the second 
suggests possible overestimation and possible underestimation; the 
third suggests underestimation.  For this reason, we lack confidence in 
our particular figures.  The only unambiguous conclusion is that the 
costs of climate change will be seriously underestimated if account is 
not taken of the use value of biological resources. 
3.  Nonuse Value 
We offer two strategies for the estimation of nonuse value.  First, 
we use contingent valuation studies of threatened species to estimate 
the monetized welfare costs of species loss from climate change.  As we 
shall see, this estimation strategy runs into very serious problems, and 
one of our goals is to explain those problems.  Second, we use expen-
ditures on the ESA as a “revealed preference” measure of species 
value.  Under both strategies, we offer a range of estimates based on 
differing assumptions about the appropriate valuation method. 
a.  Contingent Valuation:  Foundations 
Contingent valuation studies directly elicit willingness to pay 
through surveys that develop a hypothetical market for public goods.92  
Survey participants are given detailed information about the resource 
in question, as well as the nature of the proposed protection.  They 
are also informed of the consequences of protective inaction—
suffering, population loss, extinction, and so forth.  In some instances, 
willingness to pay is determined through open-ended inquiry; in oth-
ers, respondents are given a discrete set of payment choices, or even a 
single, referendum-style, yes-or-no choice for a specified dollar 
amount. 
The virtue of the contingent valuation method is that it provides a 
direct measure of human valuation and avoids the potential circularity 
of using revealed preferences based on existing regulatory practices.  
When the question is, “What amount should be spent to protect ani-
mals?” it seems most sensible to elicit people’s judgments and not to 
rely on current regulatory expenditures.  The current expenditures 
might very well be too low, because of collective-action problems in 
political action, or too high, because of interest group pressures.  On 
92 For an overview of contingent valuation methodology, see ROBERT CAMERON 
MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS:  THE 
CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 2-4 (1989). 
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the other hand, contingent valuation methods might be problematic 
because of “protest” valuations, framing problems, or other cognitive 
defects.93  We shall explore some of these problems in the context of 
climate change. 
Even with these concerns, a well-designed contingent valuation 
study may turn out to be the best or only available method for measur-
ing nonuse values.94  In the area of species loss, two major contingent 
valuation surveys have examined individual willingness to pay.  The 
first, by David Pearce, provides values for ten major threatened species 
in the United States using seven source studies.95  Pearce’s results are 
displayed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4:  Contingent Value of Species Protection (Pearce) 
 
Species 
Annual value 
per person  
($US 2005) 
Bald Eagle 18.48 
Bighorn Sheep 12.81 
Blue Whale 13.86 
Bottlenose Dolphin 10.43 
Emerald Shiner 6.71 
Grizzly Bear 27.57 
Humpback Whale 65.56 
Northern Elephant Seal 12.07 
Sea Otter 12.07 
Whooping Crane 1.79 
Total 181.33 
Per species 18.13 
Total (No Humpback) 115.77 
Per species (No Humpback) 12.86 
 
 
93 For further discussion of potential problems with the contingent valuation 
method, see CONTINGENT VALUATION:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 
1993); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation:  Is Some Number Bet-
ter Than No Number?, J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 1994, at 45, 62-63; Daniel Kahneman & 
Jack L. Knetsch, Valuing Public Goods:  The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 57, 68-69 (1992); Daniel McFadden, Contingent Valuation and Social 
Choice, 76 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 689, 706-07 (1994). 
94 DAVID W. PEARCE, ECONOMIC VALUES AND THE NATURAL WORLD 116 (1993). 
95 Id. at 74-77. 
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A more recent study by John Loomis and Douglas White surveyed 
twenty contingent valuation studies and provided values for seventeen 
threatened species.96  In Table 5, where multiple estimates for a spe-
cies are provided by Loomis and White, we use the average value.  We 
also convert their one-time, lump-sum valuations into annual values 
(using a 10% discount rate), for the purpose of making apples-to-
apples comparisons in our analysis. 
 
Table 5:  Contingent Value of Species Protection (Loomis and White) 
Species 
Annual value per 
household ($US 2005)
Annual value per 
person  ($US 2005) 
Arctic Grayling/ 
Cutthroat Trout 2.03 0.79 
Atlantic Salmon 10.80 4.20 
Bald Eagle 32.40 12.61 
Bighorn Sheep 28.35 11.03 
Gray Wolf 9.05 3.52 
Grey Whale 35.10 13.66 
Grizzly Bear 62.10 24.16 
Humpback Whale 23.36 9.09 
Monk Seal 16.20 6.30 
Northern Spotted Owl 94.50 36.77 
Pacific Salmon/Steelhead 85.05 33.09 
Red-Cockaded Woodpecker 17.55 6.83 
Sea Otter 39.15 15.23 
Sea Turtle 17.55 6.83 
Squawfish 10.80 4.20 
Striped Shiner 8.10 3.15 
Whooping Crane 47.25 18.39 
Total 539.33 209.85 
Per Species 31.73 12.34 
 
One striking fact about these two surveys is that they imply rela-
tively similar per-species valuations.  Dividing the per-household 
measure from Loomis and White by the average size of a household 
96 John B. Loomis & Douglas S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and Endangered Spe-
cies:  Summary and Meta-Analysis, 18 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 197, 199 (1996). 
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(2.57 people)97 leads to a per-species estimate of approximately $12.34 
per person annually—compared to the $18 per-person measure from 
Pearce.  Moreover, if the humpback whale outlier is removed from the 
Pearce survey, as Pearce himself suggests ought to be done,98 his sur-
vey’s average drops to $12.86 per person—virtually identical to the 
$12.34 result found by Loomis and White.  While there is some over-
lap in the contingent valuation source studies surveyed by Pearce and 
by Loomis and White,99 the fact that the per-species estimates are simi-
lar in magnitude, and not extremely sensitive to the particular species 
surveyed, is a comforting feature of the data.  Contingent valuation 
methods seem to be arriving at consistent average values. 
On the other hand, there are also some troubling irregularities.  
For example, the whooping crane is valued at $1.79 in Pearce, but an 
order of magnitude more ($18.39 per person) in Loomis and White.  
Similarly, the estimated values in both studies exceed the amounts ac-
tually expended by respondents on conservation.100  This fact, how-
ever, is consistent with a collective-action problem, and does not nec-
essarily demonstrate an erroneous methodology.  Finally, there is a 
strong possibility of reporting bias:  researchers are probably more 
likely to conduct surveys for high-value than for low-value species.  In-
deed, two of the twenty-one species surveyed (the steelhead and the 
red-cockaded woodpecker) are among the ten most costly species in 
2004 ESA expenditures.101
One final note should be made about this data.  The studies sur-
veyed by Pearce and by Loomis and White offered a variety of differ-
ent population-change scenarios in their queries.  For example, many 
of the surveys were framed in terms of gain to an endangered popula-
tion, rather than avoidance of extinction.102  In contrast, our analysis 
assumes that all elicited valuations are tied to extinction.  Since valua-
tions for extinction would presumably be higher than valuations for 
97 Average size of household is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2005 Current 
Population Survey, available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ 
hh6.pdf. 
98 Pearce, supra note 94, at 76 tbl.5.   
99 Three of the seven surveys used by Pearce, supra note 94, at 76-77, are also used 
by Loomis & White, supra note 96, at 200 tbl.2. 
100 Pearce, supra note 94, at 75. 
101 See infra Table 6. 
102 Indeed, it is well established that people attach higher values to losses than to 
gains, which would affect the results of contingent valuation studies.  See Daniel Kah-
neman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONO-
METRICA 263, 278 (1979). 
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population loss or gain without extinction, our estimates of the cost of 
climate change will be biased downward.103
b.  Contingent Value:  Estimates 
We now proceed to our estimation analysis.  We merge the Pearce 
data with the Loomis and White data, using mean values where species 
are examined in both studies, to arrive at an annual per-person will-
ingness to pay of $11.84 for a generic species.104  The obvious way to 
use this data is to multiply a society’s total willingness to pay to protect 
a species by the expected loss of 0.75 to 1.85 million species.  Using 
population figures from the 2000 census, we find an astronomical 
range estimate of $2499 trillion to $6164 trillion in annual costs for 
the United States!  Of course, this number should not be trusted.  The 
most obvious reason is that the vast majority of the 0.75 to 1.85 million 
species anticipated to be lost due to climate change are arthropods 
(such as insects).  In contrast, the contingent value studies generally 
focus on vertebrates such as mammals and birds.  Presumably, most 
people will value vertebrates more highly than, say, butterflies and 
beetles. 
An alternative estimation method would thus exclude all nonver-
tebrate species, on the assumption that human beings are not willing 
to pay anything for them.  With that exclusion, the threatened loss is 
8700 to 21,400 species.  The range estimate drops considerably but is 
still implausibly high—$29 to $71 trillion in annual costs, or anywhere 
from three to seven times annual GDP.  This number also raises a se-
rious difficulty:  would U.S. citizens be willing to pay multiples of their 
current income to protect any number of species? 
One likely problem here involves a reporting bias:  species exam-
ined by contingent valuation surveys might not be representative of 
species that are not so examined.  We adjust our estimate for this pos-
sibility in the following way.  First, we determine a mean ESA expendi-
ture for the fifteen domestic endangered species in our surveys.  We 
then de-bias our estimate by using ESA expenditures as a baseline.  
The key assumption underlying this method is that the distribution of 
ESA expenditures across species roughly captures the distribution of 
103 Only seventeen of the forty-three total queries were framed in terms of extinc-
tion loss.  See Loomis & White, supra note 96, at 200 tbl.2. 
104 We exclude the humpback whale outlier, as suggested by Pearce, supra note 94, 
at 76 tbl.15. 
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social value.  Table 6 provides the resulting species-specific expendi-
ture data. 
 
Table 6:  ESA Expenditures on Surveyed Species 
 
Species 
ESA Expenditures 
($US 2005,  
in thousands) 
Atlantic Salmon 7496 
Bald Eagle 9837 
Bighorn Sheep 714 
Blue Whale 67 
Gray Wolf 6662 
Grizzly Bear 7742 
Humpback Whale 666 
Monk Seal 2321 
Northern Spotted Owl 6980 
Pacific Salmon/Steelhead 117,380 
Red-Cockaded Woodpecker 14,125 
Sea Otter 734 
Sea Turtle 28,868 
Squawfish 5732 
Whooping Crane 1757 
Total 211,081 
Average  14,072.07 
Total (No Steelhead) 93,701 
Average (No Steelhead) 6693 
Average (All Species in ESA)105 592 
Bias factor (No Steelhead) 11.3 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 An obvious outlier in this data is the steelhead, which at $117 mil-
lion exceeds the next highest species by an order of magnitude.  In 
contrast, the contingent valuation data shows that the steelhead is val-
ued highly—the second highest in our sample—but certainly not as 
highly as suggested by its ESA expenditures.  We thus drop the steel-
head from our analysis. 
Excluding the steelhead, we calculate a bias multiple of 11.3.  That 
is, the representative species from our sample is approximately 11.3 
times more valuable than the mean endangered species.  Dividing our 
estimates of the harm of climate change by this value leads us to a re-
105 The average here differs from the average ESA cost reported below because we 
exclude non-species-specific expenditures.   
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vised cost range from $2.6 to $6.3 trillion in annual value, or anywhere 
from 27% to 66% of GDP.  Our results are summarized in Table 7. 
 
Table 7:  Total Contingent Value of Species Loss ($US 2005, in trillions) 
 
 
Low Climate 
Change 
High Climate 
Change 
Estimated Costs 2499    6164 
Estimated Costs  
(Vertebrates Only) 29   71 
Estimated Costs  
(Vertebrates Only,  
Adjusted for Reporting Bias) 2.6    6.3 
%GDP
106
 27%      66% 
 
Even these adjusted estimates should be taken with many grains of 
salt.  As noted above, contingent valuation methods are plagued by 
various anomalies.  Perhaps most important is what Daniel Kahneman 
and Jack Knetsch describe as the “embedding effect”—the tendency 
for elicited valuations to remain relatively similar across surveys, even 
where theory would predict dramatic differences in willingness to 
pay.107  One manifestation of this effect is the insensitivity of valuations 
to the size of a prospective harm; surveys often elicit similar values 
from respondents, whether 1, 10, or 100 units of a particular good are 
the subject of inquiry.108  If a contingent valuation survey were com-
missioned to examine popular willingness to pay for 10 species, it 
might very well obtain values identical to the value we use for a single 
species.  This, of course, would greatly undermine our linear aggrega-
tion method.  We strongly suspect that an exercise in multiplication, 
based on existing data, will far exceed people’s actual willingness to 
pay. 
For this reason, we do not believe that our estimate accurately cap-
tures human valuations, even in a first-best world where collective-
action problems are eliminated.  To say the least, people are unlikely 
to devote nearly all of GDP, and much less a multiple of GDP, to the 
 
106 Calculated relative to a 1995 baseline (the year of the Loomis study) from Bu-
reau of Econ. Analysis, supra note 82. 
107 Kahneman & Knetsch, supra note 93, at 58-60. 
108 See, e.g., William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with 
Contingent Valuation:  Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION:  A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 93, at 91, 94 fig.9. 
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protection of nonhuman life.  Opponents of contingent valuation will 
see our results as confirming evidence for the implausibility of the 
method; advocates will urge more careful and contextually sensitive 
inquiries. 
We offer a third possibility:  instead of interpreting the contingent 
valuation results as actual willingness to pay, we might instead under-
stand them as suggestive that people are in fact committed to the in-
trinsic value of nonhuman life—that is, the welfare of animals for their 
own sake.  Surely human society would pay many multiples of GDP to 
prevent human extinction.  And some surveys suggest that individual 
Americans value foreign human suffering by an order of magnitude 
more than what the United States actually expends to alleviate it.109  
The fact that the United States does not spend as much as its people 
state they would prefer for such causes—whether human or nonhu-
man—does not necessarily undermine the elicited figure as a norma-
tive matter, even if it does undermine it as a descriptive matter. 
In short, at this point, our conclusion is lamentably vague:  Ameri-
cans are willing to spend a great deal to protect endangered species—
and hence nonuse value, once properly monetized, is quite large. 
c.  Revealed Preference 
An alternative and less troublesome strategy for estimating nonuse 
value is to use data on current ESA expenditures to protect threatened 
animals.  A significant advantage of this data is that it reduces the 
problem just mentioned; that is, the aggregate figure is alert to a 
budget constraint, and in that sense it is much more realistic than a 
figure that emerges from aggregating willingness to pay for each indi-
vidual species, taken one at a time. 
Federal and state government expenditures on the ESA in 2004 
were approximately $1.4 billion, and were used to protect 1340 enti-
109 In a poll of Americans’ preferences for the percentage of the federal budget to 
be expended on foreign aid, Stephen Kull found that the mean response was 14%.  In 
fact, the federal government devotes less than 1% of its budget to aid.  PROGRAM ON 
INT’L POL’Y ATTITUDES, AMERICANS ON FOREIGN AID AND WORLD HUNGER:  A STUDY OF 
U.S. PUBLIC ATTITUDES 8 (2001), available at http://65.109.167.118/pipa/ 
pdf/feb01/ForeignAid_Feb01_rpt.pdf.  This study must, however, be taken with a 
grain of salt; it is possible that people would want many uses of the federal budget—
education, environmental protection, national defense, basic research—to exceed 
their current support levels, producing an implausibly high aggregate figure. 
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ties.110  (“Entity” and “species” have slightly different meanings in the 
ESA, but the differences are not significant for the purposes of our 
analysis.111)  In contrast, expenditures in 1994 were only $245 million.  
While part of the reason for this vast jump is the use of a different, 
and more expansive, measure for expenditures starting in 2001,112 
there is nonetheless a clear and steady trend of increased expendi-
tures over the past decade.  The seven-year period from 1994 to 2000 
saw an approximate 150% nominal increase; the period from 2002 to 
2004 (under the new measure of expenditures) saw an approximate 
19% increase.  (The year 2001 was an outlier in the general trend, 
with $2.4 billion in expenditures.113) 
Part of the reason for this expenditure trend is an increase in the 
number of listed species.  In 1994, there were 914 listed organisms; 
there was thus a 47% increase in listed endangered or threatened spe-
cies over the examined period.  The per-species average, however, has 
jumped far more than 47%—from $0.27 million per species in 1994 to 
$1.05 million in 2004, a 290% increase.114  There are at least two eco-
nomic explanations for this increase.  First, as social wealth increases, 
demand for species protection will increase, especially if environ-
mental protection is a “luxury” good.  Second, as more species go ex-
tinct, preservation of a marginal species might be deemed more im-
portant.  It is also possible, of course, that the increase is simply the 
result of changing moral commitments or interest group politics.115
 
 
 
110 The operational categories for expenditures at the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice include fisheries, refuge, land acquisition, law enforcement, research, listing, and 
consultation, among others.  State agencies do not have the same formal categories, 
but they undertake similar activities.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 3. 
111 “Entity” is a narrower category than “species,” so a single species might be rep-
resented by multiple entities in the endangered species list.  Id. at 2.  The per-species 
values we report, therefore, will be underestimates. 
112 In particular, nonspecific expenditures were recorded beginning in 2001.  Id. 
113 Id. at 7 tbl.c. 
114 Id. 
115 Public choice dynamics, however, could cut in the other direction as well.  
Widespread but relatively weak preferences generally lead to collective-action problems 
in the provision of public goods.  See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION:  PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 165-67 (1971) (arguing that 
large groups of individuals with little to gain are unlikely to act together).  If collective-
action problems in protecting endangered species are significant, then our revealed-
preference measure will significantly underestimate the true value of such protection. 
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Table 8:  Federal and State Expenditures on ESA (Nominal Dollars)
116
 
Year 
Expenditures 
(in millions) 
Listed 
Entities 
Per Species 
Average (in millions) 
1994 245 914 0.27 
1995 298 957 0.31 
1996 286 963 0.30 
1997 301 1111 0.27 
1998 454 1166 0.39 
1999 514 1202 0.43 
2000 610 1235 0.49 
2001 2442 1272 1.92 
2002 1192 1285 0.93 
2003 1201 1335 0.90 
2004 1412 1340 1.05 
The expenditure data can be used directly to estimate a social cost 
for species loss from climate change (note that we are dealing here 
with the costs to Americans alone, which will bias our estimates down-
ward).  Current expenditures on endangered species act as a (mini-
mum) revealed preference for species loss more generally.117  Follow-
ing Randy Simmons and Kimberly Frost, we assume that the true cost 
of the ESA (including compliance and opportunity costs) is sixfold 
nominal government expenditures, making the 2004 per-species value 
approximately $6.32 million.118  This is a conservative multiple; com-
pliance costs in environmental regulation often dominate direct gov-
ernment expenditures by an order of magnitude or more.119
116 Table 8 is derived from U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.C. 
117 See Don Coursey, The Revealed Demand for a Public Good:  Evidence from Endangered 
and Threatened Species, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 411, 413-14 (1997) (using public expendi-
tures on endangered species to assess the “‘revealed public demand” for each species). 
118 See SIMMONS & FROST, supra note 12, at 16 (determining that actual expendi-
tures were four times that reported by the government). 
119 The exact multiple is likely to vary significantly on a case-by-case basis; we pro-
ceed merely on the assumption that there is a rough correlation between government 
expenditures and total social costs.  It is worth noting, however, that the sixfold multi-
ple is probably very conservative.  The Bonneville Power Administration, in California, 
estimated that its compliance costs (including the opportunity cost of lost power reve-
nues) with regulations governing a single species of salmon were approximately $350 
million in 1994 (compared to the mere $245 million in total expenditures reported for 
all species and government entities in that same year).  Compare Brown & Shogren, su-
pra note 46, at 13, with U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.C.  Similarly, 
regulations protecting the California coastal gnatcatcher will likely lead to compliance 
  
1732 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1695 
 
We first estimate the cost of climate change with no adjustments 
for taxonomic distribution.  The $6.32 million per-species revealed 
preference from 2004 implies a range estimate of $4.9 to $12.0 trillion 
annually.  A serious criticism of this estimate is that it fails to account 
for the fact that ESA expenditures are distributed unevenly.  The top 
100 species account for almost 90% of the government expenditures, 
and the top 50 account for a little more than 75%.120  Presumably, op-
portunity and compliance costs would be similarly proportioned.  As 
long as the taxonomic distribution of species threatened by climate 
change is the same as the distribution of currently listed endangered 
species, this should not be a problem.  However, this is unlikely to be 
the case, as arthropods make up the vast majority of existing species 
but a relatively small portion of the ESA’s list, and an even smaller 
portion of the top 100.121   
Thus, a more plausible estimate focuses on vertebrate species.  In 
Table 9, we break down expenditures by taxonomy and calculate a 
value for per-vertebrate loss.  Notably, as with the vertebrate analysis 
using the contingent valuation method, we ignore impacts on nonver-
tebrate life.  This will serve to bias our estimate downward. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and opportunity costs of up to $5 billion in the period from 2003 to 2020.  DAVID L. 
SUNDING, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION FOR THE COASTAL 
CALIFORNIA GNATCATCHER, at ii (2003), available at http://www.calresources.org/ 
CRMICHGnatcatcherAnalysis.pdf.  Total government expenditures, in contrast, were 
only around $1.4 million in 2004—suggesting up to a 294:1 ratio of true costs to ex-
penditures.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.C.  While the species 
that have been examined carefully for total social costs are unlikely to be perfectly rep-
resentative, they are at least suggestive of the likely average ratio. 
120 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 51-54 tbl.2. 
121 It is worth noting, however, that two arthropods do make the ESA top 100 list. 
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Table 9:  ESA Revealed Preference by Taxon 
Taxonomy 
No.  of   
Species 
2004  
Expenditures 
($US 2004, 
millions) 
2004  
% 
Share 
2004  
Expenditures 
(Adjusted) 
Per  
Species 
Social 
Cost122
Mammals 86 122 0.15 208 14.51 
Birds 98 103 0.13 176 10.75 
Reptiles 40 42 0.05 72 10.74 
Amphibians 19 8 0.01 14 4.31 
Fish 142 475 0.60 810 34.22 
Total  384 750 0.94 1280 19.98 
Total  
(No Fish) 243 275 0.34 470 11.58 
 
Table 9 summarizes per-species values by vertebrate taxon.  An ob-
vious outlier is fish, where the annual per-species revealed social value 
is a whopping $34 million—arguably the result of mixed use and non-
use value.123  One might question why commercial fish interests would 
lobby for endangered species protection rather than direct subsidies.  
We nonetheless calculate net social values both including and exclud-
ing fish.  The results, which are not vastly divergent, are reported in 
Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Costs of Climate Change to the U.S.:  Revealed Preference  
($US 2005, in billions; %GDP in parentheses)
124
 
 Low Climate Change High Climate Change 
Costs (No Exclusion) 4882 (39.5%) 12,043 (96.9%) 
Costs (No Arthropods) 179 (1.4%) 439 (3.5%) 
Costs (No Fish)* 104 (0.8%) 255 (2.1%) 
 
 
122 6x multiple, $US 2004, in millions. 
123 A representative of the National Marine Fisheries Service offered three expla-
nations for the unusually high expenditures on fish.  First, many fish species have sig-
nificant commercial value.  Second, fish species often serve as indicators (“canaries”) 
for the health of aquatic ecosystems.  Protecting fish therefore implicitly entails pro-
tecting many other aquatic species.  Third, fish implicate many diverse sectors of the 
economy—fisheries, hydropower, and even the timber industry.  Email from Marta 
Nammack, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., to Wayne Hsiung (Sept. 8, 2006) (on file with 
authors). 
124 Asterisk indicates best estimate. 
  
1734 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1695 
The estimated cost including fish ranges from $179 to $439 billion 
annually, or 1.4% to 3.5% of GDP.  The estimated range excluding 
fish, which should be viewed as the best estimate, is $104 to $255 bil-
lion, or 0.8% to 2.1% of GDP.  Again, since both of these estimates ex-
clude all nonvertebrate life, they should be viewed with skepticism.  
Downwardly biased as they are, the minimum values of these ranges 
are nonetheless very high—$104 billion is nearly as high as the pro-
jected annual abatement costs of the Kyoto Protocol.125
D.  Summary and Caveats 
Our best estimate of the total cost of climate change in terms of 
species loss, including both use and nonuse values, is $162 to $399 bil-
lion, or 1.4% to 3.5% of GDP, using the revealed preference method.  
The range variance is driven by uncertainty in the global temperature 
projections.  Thus, we can move from the high end of these cost esti-
mates to the low end, if climate change is mitigated.126
 
Table 11:  Net Costs of Climate Change for the United States  
($US 2005, in billions; %GDP in parentheses) 
 
 Low Climate Change High Climate Change 
Use 58 (0.6%) 144 (1.4%) 
Revealed Preference (RP) 104 (0.8%) 255 (2.1%) 
Contingent Value (CV) 2565 (27%) 6310 (66%) 
Total (Use + RP) 162 (1.4%) 399 (3.5%) 
Total (Use + CV) 2623 (27.6%) 6454 (67.4%) 
 
We can now take a fresh look at the costs and benefits of the Kyoto 
Protocol.127  While there is significant debate over the effectiveness of 
 
125 See Terry Barker & Paul Ekins, The Costs of Kyoto for the US Economy, 25 ENERGY J. 
53, 69-70 (2004) (finding that the costs to the United States of the Kyoto Protocol 
would have been less than 1% of GDP); William D. Nordhaus, Global Warming Econom-
ics, 294 SCIENCE 1283, 1284 (2001) (estimating that the United States would have in-
curred annual abatement costs of $125 billion if it had joined the Kyoto Protocol). 
126 An approximately 1.2°C mitigation in expected climate change will move us 
from the high climate change scenario to the low climate change scenario. 
127 We focus exclusively on the most commonly cited version of the Protocol, 
which allows permit trading between “Annex I” (largely high income) countries.  Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 
1997, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
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Kyoto, some estimates anticipate mitigation of approximately 0.15°C 
by 2100.128  Nordhaus and Boyer have suggested that mitigation might 
be as low as 0.03°C, as fossil fuel emissions shift to developing coun-
tries.  The costs of Kyoto are similarly disputed, but most models sug-
gest annual costs of anywhere from 0% to 4% of GDP, with a value in 
the lower end of that range (less than 1%) being most plausible.129  
Nordhaus, a treaty skeptic, most recently estimated annual abatement 
costs of $125 billion for the United States130—$186 billion in 2005 dol-
lars—compared to the $18 billion estimated benefit.  (For compara-
tive purposes, the U.S. budget for national defense is over $400 billion 
annually.131) 
If species loss (not animal loss as a whole) is included, the calculus 
is significantly changed.  Using the revealed preference measure of 
willingness to pay, we estimate that if the Kyoto Protocol reduces 
warming by 0.15°C, it would buy around $30 billion in annual savings, 
relative to its worst-case $186 billion annual cost.  Even under the most 
conservative cost-benefit assumptions, the impact of climate change 
on nonhuman life alone justifies almost one-sixth of the costs of the 
128 Parry and his coauthors estimate 0.15°C mitigation.  The World Energy Council 
also predicts 0.15°C mitigation.  Nordhaus and Boyer, in contrast, suggest 0.13°C in an 
initial paper, but predict a mere 0.03°C in mitigation in their latest models.  See Martin 
Parry et al., Buenos Aires and Kyoto Targets Do Little To Reduce Climate Change Impacts, 8 
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 285, 286 (1998) (estimating that the relative warming by 2100 
would be 2.54°C if left unmitigated, but would be 2.39°C if mitigated under Kyoto); 
Michael Jefferson, Deputy Sec’y Gen., World Energy Council, Keynote Address to the 
31st Conference of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.:  Global Warming and 
Global Energy After Kyoto, chart 8 (Apr. 20, 1998), available at 
http://www.worldenergy.org/wecgeis/publications/default/archives/speeches/ 
spc980420MJb.asp (graphing the projected effect of Kyoto on global mean tempera-
ture and estimating an approximately 0.15°C mitigating effect by 2100); William 
Nordhaus & Joseph Boyer, Requiem for Kyoto:  An Economic Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, 
ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE), 93, 104 (1999) (projecting a  0.13°C mitigation); NORD-
HAUS & BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD, supra note 7, at 152 (projecting a 0.03°C mitiga-
tion). 
129 For a survey of various models, see Barker & Ekins, supra note 125, at 55-70.  See 
also LOMBORG, supra note 8, at 303 (mentioning the many models of Kyoto that have 
been developed and how they “generally found much the same picture in relative 
terms”); Nordhaus, supra note 125, at 1283 (noting both the challenges of modeling 
agreements such as Kyoto and the various models that have been developed, and 
choosing to apply an updated regional integrated model of climate and the economy 
in analyzing Kyoto). 
130 See Nordhaus, supra note 125, at 1284. 
131 OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), NATIONAL DEFENSE 
BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR FY 2006, at 5 tbl.1-2 (Apr. 2005), available at 
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/fy2006_greenbook.pdf. 
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Kyoto Protocol for the United States.132  Because of its low anticipated 
value for the United States, the Kyoto Protocol nonetheless continues 
to impose costs in excess of benefits.  But it is noteworthy that the cost-
benefit calculus is improved significantly by the inclusion of nonhu-
man life. 
The picture for the rest of the world is better.  While both our 
contingent value and revealed preference data are drawn from U.S. 
sources, we can make a back-of-the-envelope calculation for the rest of 
the world by using the United States’s proportion of global GDP as a 
scaling factor.133  The predicted value of the Kyoto Protocol in protect-
ing natural biological systems is $74 billion for the rest of the world, 
making the total value of the Protocol approximately $78 billion in to-
tal.134  The net value of the treaty for the world, however, is still nega-
tive, at –$77 billion annually, given the heavy U.S. costs. 
 
Table 12:  Value of the Kyoto Protocol  
($US 2005, in billions annually) 
 
US Value (No Animals) -185 
US Savings from Protection of Animals 30 
US Total -155 
Rest of World Value (No Animals) 4 
Rest of World Savings from Protection of Animals 74 
Rest of World Total 78 
World Total (Including US) -77 
 
It is worth reiterating that our estimates of the cost of climate 
change include a number of conservative assumptions.  First and most 
notably, we have ignored any impacts of climate change short of ex-
tinction.  In reality, both the use and nonuse value of nonhuman life 
will be dramatically affected by declines in population and suffering 
independent of extinction.  Even species that survive will face habitat 
loss of up to 85% under high-end climate change scenarios—with 
 
132 Under the low, 0.03°C mitigation scenario suggested by Nordhaus and Boyer, 
the Protocol would buy the U.S. $6 billion in annual value. 
133 The key assumption in this calculation is that the rest of the world is willing to 
spend to protect nonhuman life in proportion to its GDP. 
134 We use Nordhaus and Boyer’s 2000 data for our calculations of the benefits 
value of the Kyoto Protocol to the United States and the world.  See NORDHAUS & 
BOYER, supra note 7, at 145-68. 
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population declines of similar magnitude.135  One could plausibly am-
plify all of our cost estimates by a substantial figure on this basis.  At 
first glance, an 85% multiplier might be a place to start.  To the extent 
that people place a special premium on the loss of species, however, 
that figure is likely to be far too high.  Nonetheless, an estimate of will-
ingness to pay for the loss of many millions of animals would un-
doubtedly produce substantial figures.  And if human willingness to 
pay does not adequately capture that loss—as we believe—then such 
an estimate is itself likely to be far too low. 
Second, our reported “best estimates” of nonuse value have ne-
glected nonvertebrate life entirely.  This is necessary because of data 
limitations.  Contingent valuation studies tend to examine charismatic 
mammals and birds rather than insects or plants.  The ESA expendi-
tures we use for revealed preference analysis cluster around a similar 
set of organisms.  Nonvertebrates nonetheless account for approxi-
mately 5% of total ESA expenditures.136  It might be reasonable, there-
fore, to increase our nonuse estimates by that factor. 
Third, we have made a number of assumptions that have an un-
quantifiable but downward impact on cost estimates.  For example:  
We assume a low-end value for the number of species and the number 
of vertebrates.  We ignore the impact of a possible increase in extreme 
weather events.  And we do not even attempt to quantify the risk of 
catastrophic ecosystem destruction stemming from abrupt climate 
change.  All of these factors will serve to bias our estimates downward. 
Fourth, in our evaluation of Kyoto, we ignore the potential learn-
ing value of the Protocol in establishing a test case and framework for 
future international agreements on climate change.  Indeed, if we 
conceive of Kyoto as the first step in a series of progressively steeper 
greenhouse gas reductions (eventually applying to developing as well 
as developed countries), evaluating the agreement’s costs and benefits 
on the margin might be inappropriate.137
On the other hand, there are some reasons to think that our esti-
mates of the cost of climate change might be biased upward.  First, we 
135 E-mail from Chris D. Thomas, Professor of Conservation Biology, Univ. of York, 
to Wayne Hsiung (June 22, 2006) (on file with authors).   
136 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 9-49 tbl.1 (tabulating FY 2004 
expenditures for all endangered and threatened species). 
137 Nordhaus concedes the learning value of the Protocol.  See Nordhaus, supra 
note 125, at 1284 (noting that “the major merit of [Kyoto] is that it is the first experi-
ment with market instruments in a truly global environmental agreement,” thus mak-
ing it a potentially “useful if expensive guinea pig”). 
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assume that individuals in the United States value unknown and for-
eign wildlife as much as they value domestic wildlife.  Revealed prefer-
ence analysis suggests dramatic differences in the value of domestic 
versus foreign human lives.138  Might the same be true for animals? 
Since the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has no jurisdiction over 
foreign wildlife, we cannot compare expenditures for domestic and 
foreign species in any precise fashion.  We offer two reasons, however, 
to think that the difference between domestic and foreign species 
value may be smaller than anticipated.  First, modern human life is so 
detached from wildlife that, to the vast majority of individuals, a do-
mestic endangered species is as “foreign” as a nondomestic one.  For 
example, among the top ten most valuable species, as measured by 
ESA expenditures, are the red-cockaded woodpecker, pallid sturgeon, 
and right whale.139  Are such species any less “foreign” than polar 
bears or giant pandas?140  Second, if there is a difference, it is not even 
clear which way the foreign/domestic distinction should cut.  Foreign 
and exotic species (tigers, elephants, etc.) might very well be more 
prized, precisely because of their rarity on U.S. lands.  Indeed, public 
and private organizations in the United States spend many millions of 
dollars annually on a handful of foreign giant pandas, possibly making 
the panda the most valued endangered species, on a per-animal basis, 
in this country.141
A second possible source of upward bias is our failure to discount.  
As a result of scientific uncertainty in the SAR models, we cannot dis-
count use value with any degree of accuracy.  And in our analysis of 
nonuse value, we assume that there are no significant timing differ-
ences between extinction caused by climate change and other sources, 
such as habitat loss. 
138 See Wojciech Kopszuk et al., The Limitations of Decentralized World Redistribution:  
An Optimal Taxation Approach, 49 EUR. ECON. REV. 1051, 1051 (2005) (estimating, by 
revealed preference, that some foreign lives, from the point of view of the United 
States, are valued at as little as 1/2000th the value of domestic lives). 
139 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 11, at 6 tbl.B. 
140 To be sure, this would not be true of some forms of use value.  However, our 
use value calculations do not depend on the foreign/domestic distinction, since we are 
not using a species multiple. 
141 See Brenda Goodman, Eats Shoots, Leaves and Much of Zoos’ Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 12, 2006, at A1 (noting that, in addition to expensive upkeep costs, Zoo Atlanta 
pays a $2 million annual fee to the Chinese government “essentially to rent a pair of 
giant pandas”); Lynne Warren, Panda, Inc., NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, July 2006, at 42, 48 
(stating that there are eleven pandas in the United States, spread out over four zoos, 
and that “[h]osting giant pandas costs each zoo an average of 2.6 million dollars a 
year,” a figure that can balloon up to $4 million with the addition of two cubs). 
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Third, we treat our measures of use and nonuse value as concep-
tually independent when, in fact, there might be significant overlap—
for example, the high ESA expenditures to protect threatened fish.142  
This is not a serious problem for the contingent valuation analysis, 
since the use value is trivial relative to our calculated nonuse values.  
However, our central revealed preference estimate would be signifi-
cantly reduced—up to 50%—by any redundancy in use and nonuse 
value. 
Finally, we should note again that we assume a linear value or cost 
function for species loss.  In reality, there are probably ranges of con-
vexity and concavity.  The recent and vast increases in per-species ex-
penditures under the ESA suggest that we are currently in a range of 
convexity.  But at some point well short of 100% of GDP, society would 
presumably decide to stop paying for species protection, or at least 
significantly reduce its marginal willingness to pay.143
CONCLUSION 
Our principal goal in this Article has been to suggest that climate 
change threatens to kill countless animals, and that their suffering and 
death should matter to climate change policy.  By all estimates, cli-
mate change is causing, and will cause, a massive loss of animal life 
and will produce a great deal of suffering.  An adequate accounting of 
the costs of climate change must consider these effects. 
At the same time, we have attempted to explore some of the com-
plexities in assigning monetary values to species and animals.  We have 
distinguished between two overlapping but independent sets of losses:  
extinction of species and harms done to particular animals.  Both of 
these losses should be included in the overall calculation.  Because of 
limitations in existing data, we have focused only on the loss of spe-
cies, with the belief that this loss is an important component of the 
problem. 
On the basis of current climate change projections, a plausible 
and conservative range estimate of lost use values, for the world as a 
whole, is from $0.5 to $1.3 trillion annually.  A plausible and conserva-
142 Of course, we exclude fish from our revealed preference analysis.  However, it 
might be the case that commercial interests are important in other instances. 
143 Putting the disputed nature of animal rights aside, this will be true due to in-
come effects.  That is, if society were actually spending a significant portion of GDP to 
protect animals, total social wealth would be reduced.  And at reduced wealth levels, 
demand for all goods and services will decrease. 
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tive estimate of lost nonuse values, for the world as a whole, is from 
$0.6 to $1.5 trillion annually.  For the United States, the correspond-
ing figures are $58 to $144 billion in lost use value and $104 to $255 
billion in lost nonuse value.  We have argued, moreover, that these es-
timates might be downwardly biased because we ignore harms short of 
extinction, ignore impacts on nonvertebrate life, and fail to account 
for a possible increase in extreme weather events.  On the other hand, 
our estimates might be upwardly biased because we fail to examine the 
distributional mix of threatened species (for example, foreign versus 
domestic), we do not even attempt to discount, and we treat our 
measures of use and nonuse value as completely nonredundant.  Fi-
nally, there is a serious and unanswered question about the curvature 
of the species value function.  Our estimates, therefore, are necessarily 
tentative. 
We have nonetheless used our analysis to take a fresh look at the 
costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol.  If the Kyoto Protocol re-
duces warming by 0.15°C, we have estimated that its benefits, for 
Americans, increase by $30 billion annually, and for the world by $74 
billion annually, with the major caveat that these savings might not be 
sustained without a permanent and long-term solution to climate 
change.  Wider and deeper restrictions on greenhouse gases—for ex-
ample, those that include developing countries, above all China, a 
growing contributor—would deliver correspondingly larger benefits. 
Our central claim here is that, for too long, the debate over cli-
mate change policy has been conducted without paying significant at-
tention to nonhuman life.  In our view, animals have intrinsic value, 
and that value should be included in any judgment about appropriate 
regulation.  But our emphasis has been on existing human valuations, 
not on abstract claims about the appropriate treatment of species and 
individual animals.  To that extent we bracket some of the most con-
troversial claims about animal welfare.  If regulators attend to human 
valuations of nonhuman life, they will find that existing estimates of 
the costs of climate change are far too low. 
 
